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THE APPEALABILITY OF DISTRICT
COURT ORDERS STAYING COURT
PROCEEDINGS PENDING ARBITRATION
PAMELA MATHY*
I. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM
The established prerequisite of review in the federal courts
of appeals has been the condition that an appeal can be taken
only from "final orders or decisions" or from specified inter-
locutory orders which grant or deny injunctions.' In 1934 the
United States Supreme Court was presented with an issue of
first impression: should a nonfinal district court order which
grants or denies a stay of court proceedings until the comple-
tion of arbitration be considered an appealable interlocutory
order.2 Prior to the fusion of law and equity, orders entered by
a court of equity which stayed proceedings at law uniformly
were appealable. In Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
the Supreme Court analogized this rule in equity to an order
entered after the fusion of law and equity which stayed pro-
ceedings at law pending resolution of an equitable claim or
defense.3 The Court found the analogy to be dispositive and
held that such an order, though interlocutory, was an appeala-
ble injunction and thus subject to immediate appellate review.
Since 1935 the Supreme Court on four occasions has ampli-
fied the scope of appellate jurisdiction over the noted -species
of order.4 In the end, a clear-cut, arbitrary and mechanical rule
was fashioned and reaffirmed. This rule, almost self-applying
once it is understood, has been followed rigorously by most
circuit courts of appeals.5 The present rule on the appealability
of stay orders achieves highly predictable results but turns on
the historical distinction between proceedings at law and in
* J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1978; M.A., University of Texas-Austin, 1976;
A.B., Marquette University, 1973. Member of the bars of the District of Columbia,
Illinois and Wisconsin.
1. See notes 7, 10, & 16 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 7-45 infra.
3. 293 U.S. 379, 381-82 (1935). See text accompanying notes 13-18 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 18-45 infra.
5. See note 9 and section II, part B infra. There has been expressed dissatisfaction
with the rule, however. See, e.g., Wallace v. Norman Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 824, 827
(5th Cir. 1972) discussed at text accompanying notes 69-75 infra.
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equity which is irrelevant to considerations underlying the
need for immediate appellate review of stay orders. It is the
thesis of this article that an alternative rule can be fashioned
which will grant or deny appeal of stay orders with reference
to a constellation of factors. The proposed rule is no more diffi-
cult to apply and should not result in a greater number of
appeals.
After briefly setting out the relevant statutes describing
appellate jurisdiction, an analysis of Supreme Court law from
Enelow to the present will be undertaken. A brief summary of
those problems causing the most difficulty at the court of ap-
peals level in applying the Supreme Court law follows.' The
third section of the article will assess the present law in light
of the policy reasons underlying arbitration and the concomi-
tant desirability of permitting appellate review of stay orders.
The main premise of the third section is that parties should
be encouraged to enter into lawful and binding arbitration
agreements which might remove the necessity of recourse to the
courts. To accomplish a conservation of judicial resources it is
necessary that some decision-making authority, in the practi-
cal if not in the absolute sense, be delegated to the arbitrator
selected by the parties and, in the second instance, to the dis-
trict courts. Once a district court has determined that the arbi-
tration agreement encompasses the contested issues and that
no exigent countervailing reason exists for the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction prior to arbitration, there should be no need
to resort to immediate appellate review. While a case-by-case
rule is flexible in its application and is somewhat unpredictable
in the results it mandates, there is no reason why standards
similar in principle to those which apply to a district court's
grant or denial of an injunction cannot be adopted with refer-
ence to appellate review of orders staying district court pro-
ceedings pending arbitration. Finally, a number of concrete
proposals are set out in order to aid both litigants and courts
which must deal with the Enelow-Ettelson rule.
6. See text accompanying notes 46-186 infra. For an example of how the appealabil-
ity of a stay order is procedurally raised within the context of a suit, see text accompa-
nying notes 55-56 infra; see also note 63 infra.
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II. COURT-MADE LAW ON THE APPEALABILITY OF ORDERS STAYING
COURT PROCEEDINGS PENDING ARBITRATION
Section 1291 of the federal Judicial Code provides that the
federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from all
"final decisions" of the federal district courts.7 The United
States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have uni-
formly held s that district court orders staying or refusing to
stay legal proceedings pending arbitration are interlocutory
and thus are not appealable under section 1291.1 Thus, the
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides in its entirety:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final deci-
sions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court
for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court.
8. But see Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1955)
(Black, J., dissenting).
9. The Supreme Court cases are: Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S.
176 (1955); City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1949); Ettelson v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942); Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Am.
Line, 294 U.S. 454 (1935); Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp.,
293 U.S. 449 (1935); Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
The Circuit Court of Appeals cases are: Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Zell v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34
(7th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); Rodgers v. United
States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975); Gray Line
Motor Tours, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 498 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1974); Danford v.
Schwabacher, 488 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1974); Mercury Motor Express v. Brinke, 475 F.2d
1086 (5th Cir. 1973); J.S. & H. Constr. Co. v. Richmond City Hosp. Auth., 473 F.2d
212 (5th Cir. 1973); Wallace v. Norman Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1972); New
England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1972); In re
Revenue Properties Litigation Cases, 451 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1971); County of Middlesex
v. Gevyn Constr. Corp., 450 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972);
Dickstein v. du Pont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971); Western Geophysical Co. of America
v. Bolt Assocs., Inc., 440 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1971); Southeastern Enameling Corp. v.
General Bronze Corp., 434 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1970); United Transp. Union v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 433 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971); Hart v.
Orion Ins. Co., 427 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1970); Power Replacements Inc. v. Air Preheater
Co., 427 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970); Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d
1100 (2d Cir. 1970); H.W. Caldwell & Sons v. United States, 407 F.2d 21 (5th Cir.
1969); Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 401 F.2d 626 (4th
Cir. 1968); Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368 (1st Cir. 1968); American Safety Equip.
Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); Carcich v. Rederi A/B
Nordie, 389 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1968); Standard Chlorine, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304
(2d Cir. 1967); Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. Troitino, 381 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Travel Consultants, Inc. v. Travel Management Corp., 367 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Wirtz v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 364 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1966); Alexander v.
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 332 F.2d 266 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964);
Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891
19791
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
question of appealability turns on whether granting or denying
a stay pending arbitration is tantamount to the granting or
denial of an injunction within the meaning of section
1292(a)(1).'1 An examination of the applicable case law shows
that the consensus of the courts has been to consider a stay
pending arbitration tantamount to the granting or denial of an
injunction pursuant to section 1292(a)(1), if the stay has been
sought in an action at common law in order to permit the prior
determination of an equitable claim or defense. The origin and
elements of this test of appealability will be examined in the
remaining sections of this part.
A. The Enelow-Ettelson Rule
The Supreme Court interpreted section 1292(a)(1) and its
(1962); Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962); Glen Oaks Utils., Inc. v.
City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1960); Hering Realty Co. v. General Constr.
Co., 272 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1959); Armstrong-Norwalk Rubber Corp. v. Local 283, 269
F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1959); Day v. Pennsylvania R.R., 243 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1957); Cuneo
Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union, 235 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1956); Wilson
Bros. v. Textile Workers Union, 224 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955); Hudson Lumber Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 181 F.2d 929 (9th Cir.
1950); United States v. Baker-Lockwood Mfg. Co., 138 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1943).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the Dis-
trict Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of
the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a
district review may be had in the Supreme Court ....
The statutory authorization of an appeal from a district court's grant or continu-
ance of an injunction has been in effect since 1891, and the statute permitting appeal
from an order refusing or dissolving an injunction has been in effect since 1895. 26 Stat.
826 (1891); 28 Stat. 666 (1895). In 1925 the statute was further amended to expand the
number of orders which were appealable (orders modifying or refusing to modify in-
junctions; orders in receiverships) and to omit the words "in equity" from the phrase
"where upon a hearing in equity in a district court." In Baltimore Contractors the
Supreme Court noted in dictum that the omission of the phrase "in equity" was not
intended to remove the limitation on appealability to those orders which were an
exercise of the district court's equity powers. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger,
348 U.S. 176, 180 n.6 (1955).
Although there is no legislative history which outlines the policy reasons underlying
the enactment of § 1291(a)(1) it has been stated repeatedly that.Congress wished to
prevent the irreparable injury which a party might suffer if he cannot appeal the grant
or denial of an injunction until a final judgment has been entered. Id. at 181; Smith
v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525 (1897). The history of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 is
outlined in the opinion of Reed, J., in Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S.
176, 179-83 (1955). See also Wright, The Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 23 F.R.D.
199 (1959).
[Vol. 63:31
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predecessor section 227" in five cases.' 2 The rule on the appeal-
ability of stay orders, however, has been denominated the
Enelow-Ettelson rule, thus arbitrarily immortalizing two of
those cases. Careful analysis shows that Enelow and Ettelson
are really at odds with one another. Enelow established the
baseline rule, Ettelson expanded its applicability, and subse-
quent cases reinterpreted Ettelson and thereby limited its
scope. While current Supreme Court law places the principles
of Enelow in the ascendancy, the suggested rule set out in part
three of this article places greater reliance on the central logic
of Ettelson.
1. Enelow
In Enelow v. New York Life Insurance Co., 13 decided before
the merger of law and equity, plaintiff sued at law upon a life
insurance contract issued in December, 1931, on the life of
plaintiff's husband who died in May, 1933. Defendant insur-
ance company set up an affirmative defense that the policy had
been obtained by means of a materially fraudulent application.
Defendant requested that its equitable defense be heard in
advance of trial by jury of the legal issues.'4 The district court
granted the petition, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
on the ground that the district court should not have ordered
a hearing in equity prior to the trial of the action at law. 5 In
11. Section 129 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 227 (1940) is quoted in note 16
infra.
12. See the Supreme Court cases cited in note 9 supra. See also Schoenamsgruber
v. Hamburg Am. Line, 294 U.S. 454 (1935).
13. 293 U.S. 379 (1935).
14. This petition was presented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 398 (1934) (§ 274b of the
Judicial Code). The text of § 398 is as follows:
Equitable defenses and equitable relief in actions at law. In all actions
at law equitable defenses may be interposed by answer, plea, or replication
without the necessity of filing a bill on the equity side of the court. The defen-
dant shall have the same rights in such case as if he had filed a bill embodying
the defense of seeking the relief prayed for in such answer or plea. Equitable
relief respecting the subject matter of this suit may thus be obtained by answer
or plea. In case affirmative relief is prayed in such answer or plea, the plaintiff
shall file a replication. Review of the judgment or decree entered in such case
shall be regulated by rule of court. Whether such review be sought by writ of
error or by appeal the appellate court shall have full power to render such
judgment upon the records as law and justice shall require.
15. 293 U.S. at 385-86.
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its analysis the Court addressed the preliminary issue of the
appealability of the order under review.
Whether any court of appeals has the jurisdiction to review
a district court order granting a hearing on the equitable issues
prior to the jury trial on the legal issues depends on whether
the order can be considered as one granting an injunction
within the purview of section 227, the predecessor to section
1292(a) (1). ' The Enelow Court concluded that, although inter-
locutory, the order was appealable as one that granted an in-
junction. It reasoned that prior to the enactment of section
274b of the Judicial Code, the defendant could have raised his
equitable defense only by bringing an independent suit. Thus,
the district court was using its power as chancellor in granting
or refusing to grant a stay of the prosecution of the legal claims
and the order, in effect, is one granting or refusing an injunc-
tion. 7
16. Section 129 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. § 227 (1940)) provided in part as
follows:
Where . . . an injunction is granted, continued, modified, refused, or dissolved
by an interlocutory order or decree, or an application to dissolve or modify an
injunction is refused. . . an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order
or decree ....
The companion section 128 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. § 225 (1938)) provided as
follows:
(a) Review of final decisions. The circuit courts of appeal shall have appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal final decisions -
First. In the district courts, in all cases save where a direct review of the
decision may be had in the Supreme Court under section 238.
Second. In the United States District Courts for Hawaii and for Puerto
Rico, in all cases.
Third. In the District Court for the District of Alaska, or any division
thereof, and in the District Court of the Virgin Islands, in all cases; and
in the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone in
the cases and modes prescribed in sections 61 and 62, title 7, Canal Zone
Code (48 Stat. 1122).
Fourth. In the Supreme Courts of the Territory of Hawaii and of Puerto
Rico, in all cases, civil or criminal, wherein the Constitution or a statute
or treaty of the United States or any authority exercised thereunder is
involved; in all other civil cases wherein the value in controversy, exclu-
sive of interests and costs, exceeds $5,000, and in all habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.
Fifth. In the United States Court for China, in all cases.
17. 293 U.S. at 383. In so holding the Court inferentially rejected any argument to
the effect that both legal and equitable proceedings were pending in the same court
and therefore the district court order was merely controlling the progress of the litiga-
tion before it, but was not "staying" the proceedings at law.
[Vol. 63:31
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Decided on the same day as Enelow was Shanferoke Coal
& Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp.,'" which further
clarified the scope of the appealability rule. In Shanferoke
plaintiff sued for damages owing for a breach of contract. The
defendant set up the contract's arbitration clause as an affirm-
ative defense and requested that the district court action be
stayed until arbitration was entered into and completed. The
district court construed the arbitration clause as being enforce-
able only in New York state courts 9 and therefore denied the
stay. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the
ground that even if the district court had properly construed
the arbitration clause, the United States Arbitration Act au-
thorized the stay.20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed. The Court concluded that the district court order
denying the stay was not appealable as a final order pursuant
to section 227, the predecessor to section 1291.21 However, the
Court cited Enelow in support of its conclusion that the order
denying the stay based on an equitable defense interposed in
an action at law was appealable as an "injunction" pursuant
to section 227, the predecessor to section 1292(a).22 The Court
concluded that the equitable defense asserted in this case was
"the special defense setting up the arbitration agreement" it-
self." The Court noted that so long as the terms of the arbitra-
tion agreement do not clearly prohibit proceedings in the fed-
eral court, "it is immaterial whether or not the terms of the
contract sued on would preclude entry in federal court of a
decree for specific performance of the arbitration. '24 In sum,
the law of appealability of stay orders under Enelow and
18. 293 U.S. 449 (1935).
19. The clause is reproduced in its entirety at 293 U.S. 450-51.
20. Section 3 of the United States Arbitration Act provided in its entirety:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceed-
ing with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1925).
21. 293 U.S. at 451. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
22. 293 U.S. at 452. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
23. 293 U.S. at 452.
24. Id. The significance of this point is best explained in a discussion of the circuit
courts of appeals' interpretations of the Enelow case discussed in part B infra.
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Shanferoke is that an order granting or denying a stay of
common-law proceedings pending arbitration is appealable if
the stay permitted the prior determination of an equitable de-
fense.
2. Ettelson
Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,25 contains the
first Supreme Court consideration of the appealability of stay
orders since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The underlying facts and procedural history are substan-
tially identical to those in Enelow. Plaintiff sued defendant to
recover amounts allegedly due under life insurance policies is-
sued on the life of plaintiff's deceased spouse. Plaintiff de-
manded a jury trial. The defendant set up a defense that the
policies were obtained by fraudulent statements made by the
insured in his application for the policies. Defendant also inter-
posed a counterclaim for cancellation of the policies upon re-
turn by defendant of the premiums paid and for an injunction
prohibiting plaintiffs from prosecuting their action at law. The
district court ruled that the counterclaim for cancellation and
injunction should be disposed of by the court sitting in equity
before trial by jury on the claims at law. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction but certified the issue to the Supreme Court.
The precise question presented on certification was whether an
order which requires a counterclaim formerly sounding in eq-
uity to be heard by the court prior to the jury's disposition of a
claim of a character formerly cognizable at law is an appealable
injunction within the meaning of section 227.25
The Supreme Court in a two-step reasoning process unani-
mously concluded that it was an appealable order. First, the
Court concluded that the newly adopted Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure did not necessarily change the application of the rule
established in Enelow. 27 Defendant had argued that the effect
of the enactment of the rules was to destroy the statutory basis
25. 317 U.S. 188 (1942).
26. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
27. Rule 1 states that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." Rule 2, in its entirety provides that
"[t]here shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.'" FED. R. Civ. P. 1;
2.
[Vol. 63:31
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for holding that the order appealed from was an appealable
"injunction" of a separate proceeding, but rather that the order
was an interlocutory stay of one phase of a single court proceed-
ing entered to effectuate the Court's inherent power to control
the progress of the litigation before it.2s The Court also noted
that the determinative factor in deciding whether an order has
an injunctive effect, and thus, whether the order is appealable
is not the label given to the district court action but whether
the order "may, in practical effect, terminate that action."29
Because the Ettelson Court explicitly relied upon Enelow in
coming to this result, there is an uncertainty over whether the
Court was merely amplifying in dictum the reasons behind the
rule in Enelow or whether the Court was shifting the emphasis
of the rule from a ritualistic determination of claims and defen-
ses at law or in equity to a case-by-case determination of the
injunctive effect of the order." This uncertainty was removed
in the two remaining Supreme Court cases addressing the
issue.31
3. The Synthesis
With Enelow and Shanferoke the Supreme Court adopted
a two-pronged test for appealability of stay orders: (1) Is the
action in which the order was made an action which before the
fusion of law and equity was "at common law"? (2) Was the
stay of the common-law claims sought to permit the prior deter-
28. Significantly enough, the Court did not expressly adopt the argument of plain-
tiff that the distinction between law and equity, with respect to the right of appeal,
must persist as a constitutional requirement. 317 U.S. at 189.
29. Id. at 191-92. The Court went on to note that the order under review
is as effective in these respects as an injunction issued by a chancellor. If the
order be found to be erroneous, it will have to be set aside and the plaintiffs
permitted to pursue their action to judgment. The plaintiffs are, therefore, in
the present instance, in no different position than if a state equity court had
restrained them from proceeding in the law action. Nor are they differently
circumstanced than was the plaintiff in the Enelow case. The relief afforded by
§ 129 is not restricted by the terminology used. The statute looks to the substan-
tial effect of the order made.
Id. (citations omitted).
30. An alternate ground for decision, unnecessary though it may be, is to be treated
as a necessary part of the holding for "where a decision rests on two or more grounds,
none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum." Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949).
31. For a discussion of the parallel development in the law of the right to trial by
jury, see text accompanying notes 162-170 infra.
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mination of an equitable defense or counterclaim? In Ettelson
the Court gave the test a new gloss when it held that the test
of the appealability of a stay order is not whether the action
was commenced "at common law" rather than "in equity" but
whether the order has an injunctive effect or whether its entry
invokes the normal equitable principles underlying an injunc-
tion. Whether the°Ettelson holding was intended to mark an
abandonment of the first prong of the Enelow test was settled
by the Supreme Court in City of Morgantown v. Royal Insur-
ance Co.,32 and Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger.33
In Morgantown the insurance company sought reformation
of a policy covering property loss contending that a claim for
damage caused by fire and lightning was not covered since the
parties intended that the contract cover only windstorm dam-
age. The insured answered denying mutual mistake and coun-
terclaimed seeking recovery on the policy as written and de-
manded a jury trial. The district court granted the insurance
company's motion to strike the demand. The court of appeals
dismissed an appeal of this order on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court refused to hold that the mo-
tion to strike was in effect a bill in equity to enjoin the prosecu-
tion of the insured's claim at law. In the Court's view, the
policy against piecemeal litigation reflected in the Rules of
Civil Procedure and the concomitant adoption of a single uni-
fied practice necessitated the conclusion that the district court
judge had only made "a ruling as to the manner in which he
will try one issue in a civil action pending before himself."34
Since this was arguably all that the district court had done in
Enelow or Ettelson, Morgantown seemed to be a repudiation
of those cases.35 However, five years later the Supreme Court
32. 337 U.S. 254 (1949).
33. 348 U.S. 176 (1955).
34. 337 U.S. at 257.
35. The majority perhaps tried to mitigate its implicit rejection of Enelow-Ettelson
by noting that
[wihatever the present validity of the analogy to common-law practice
which supported those cases, it is of no help here. This is not a situation where
a "chancellor" in denying a demand for a jury trial can be said to be enjoining
a "judge" who has cognizance of a pending action at law.
Id.
Justice Frankfurter filed a concurring opinion which carefully noted that while the
majority did not base its decision on the rubric adopted in Enelow-Ettelson, the rule
of decision adopted therein adequately supports the holding. The concurrence noted
[Vol. 63:31
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again fine-tuned the appealability rule in Baltimore Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. Bodinger and made it clear that the holding of
Enelow remained the preferred rule.
In Baltimore Contractors, plaintiff Bodinger brought an"
equitable action for an accounting of the profits of a joint ven-
ture. Defendant moved to stay the action citing section 3 of the
United States Arbitration Act36 which authorizes a stay by a
federal court when an issue is "referable to arbitration under
an agreement in writing for such arbitration. 37 The district
court denied the stay on the ground that the agreement to
arbitrate did not apply to the dispute in question. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. On certiorari, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the trial court order was neither a final decision
under section 1291,38 nor an interlocutory order appealable
under section 1292.11 In so holding the Court made it clear that
it had not abandoned either portion of the two-step process
outlined in Enelow or Ettelson. Noting that "it is better judi-
cial practice to follow the precedents which limit appealability
of interlocutory orders, leaving Congress to make such amend-
ments as it may find proper,"" the Court concluded that the
Enelow rule did not require an immediate appeal. The
Baltimore Contractors Court held that the Enelow rule gov-
that the facts in Morgantown are exactly the converse of those involved in Enelow and
while the "layman may see no difference between the postponement by a trial judge
of an action at law, and the postponement of such action by an equitable proceeding
.. . the Congress has seen fit to allow an appeal from one result and not from the
other." 337 U.S. at 261.
Justices Black and Rutledge filed a dissent concluding that the effect of the major-
ity is to reinterpret § 129 of the Judicial Code [now 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)] and to
overrule Enelow-Ettelson. The dissent applied the two-pronged test of Enelow-
Ettelson (inferentially concluding that Ettelson did not depart from Enelow), deter-
mined that the underlying case for reformation was in equity, and that the granting
of the motion to strike the jury demand was "in effect" a denial of a stay of the
equitable claims pending disposition of a defense at law. The dissenting justices em-
phasized the importance of the right to trial by jury and concluded that the anomaly
of denying appeal here but permitting appeal if the defendant had sued at common
law in state court and if the plaintiff in federal court had secured a stay of that suit,
could not be permitted to stand. 337 U.S. at 264.
36. See note 20 supra.
37. The arbitration clause is reproduced at 348 U.S. at 177.
38. Id. at 179.
39. Id. at 185.




erned the appeal of orders determining equitable defenses or
counterclaims interposed into a legal proceeding. But, because
the procedural setting of Baltimore Contractors concerned an
equitable proceeding for reformation with a counterclaim at
law, "the decision to hear the reformation issue first without a
jury was only a decision as to how to try the case, and therefore
was not an interlocutory order in the nature of an injunction."4'
In sum, since it is clear that a literal reading of Ettelson
expands the scope of appealable interlocutory orders to include
those stay orders which possess an injunctive effect regardless
of the formal characterization of the proceedings in which they
have been entered, Baltimore Contractors, by reasserting the
need for an underlying common-law claim, is a retreat, how-
ever carefully masked. The Court in Baltimore Contractors
acknowledged the "incongruity" of taking jurisdiction in a
legal proceeding and denying jurisdiction in an equitable pro-
ceeding, but refused to fashion a simpler rule in deference to
congressional prerogatives.42 The deficiencies of this approach
were adequately voiced in the dissenting opinion entered by
Justices Black and Douglas. The dissent cites the anomaly of
refusing appeal of a stay order entered in an equity proceeding
but permitting appeal if the same order were entered by a judge
in another case.4 3 The dissent concludes that "the Court's
obeisance to these incongruous fictions"44 of "law" and "eq-
uity" is not required by congressional enactments. Rather, the
dissent further concludes that the policy against piecemeal
appeals requires the courts to define the requirements of sec-
tion 1292 flexibly in order to avoid useless delays and expen-
ses.
45
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the Enelow-Ettelson
rule, the Supreme Court has declined to consider the issue
since the 1955 Baltimore Contractors case. While the Court in
Baltimore Contractors used a separation of powers argument to
commit itself to the Enelow and Morgantown precedents limit-
41. Id. at 183. The Supreme Court said that this result was controlled by its deci-
sion in City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1949).
42. 348 U.S. at 184-85.
43. Id. at 186. This is precisely the rationale used by the Court in Enelow to permit
appeal under § 1292(a)(1). See note 3 supra.
44. Id.
45. Additionally, the dissenters held that the district court order was a final
"collateral" order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1954). 384 U.S. at 185. See text
accompanying note 8 supra.
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ing appeal, rather than the expansive Ettelson approach,
Baltimore Contractors has been read by the courts of appeals
as following and keeping alive both lines of cases subsumed in
the Enelow-Ettelson rule. With Baltimore Contractors it is
clear that despite the counsel of the dissent in that case, the
central thesis of Ettelson has been redefined to comply fully
with the more limited dictates of Enelow. Notwithstanding
certain flashes of independence the courts of appeals have fol-
lowed the Supreme Court formulation of the Enelow-Ettelson
rule.
B. Application of the Enelow-Ettelson Rule by Circuit Courts
of Appeals
The appealability of an order staying or refusing to stay a
court action pending completion of arbitration depends on the
type of proceeding in which the order is entered. There are
basically two broad classifications of proceedings where the
question of appealability has arisen in the courts of appeals: (1)
a motion to compel or to prevent arbitration; and (2) an action
for an injunction to compel or to prevent arbitration. Each will
be discussed seriatim.
1. Motions to Compel and to Prevent Arbitration in a Pend-
ing Suit
a. Motions to Compel Arbitration
A party may make a motion to refer issues to arbitration in
one of two ways. If the underlying federal claim does not con-
cern maritime aspects or commerce the motion is made pur-
suant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and must make
reference to the terms of an arbitration agreement which alleg-
edly govern the resolution of the issues. If the underlying fed-
eral claim involves a maritime or commercial transaction, sec-
tion 3 of the United States Arbitration Act may apply. Section
3 of the Arbitration Act permits a party to a pending federal
action to move for a stay to permit issues to be referred to and
resolved by an arbitrator." The district court must determine
that there is a written agreement to arbitrate" and that the
issues are subject to arbitration under the terms of the agree-
46. The present text of § 3 is identical to the version existing in 1925. See note 20
supra.
47. Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944).
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ment. 8 Once it makes these two findings it permissibly may
stay the court action pending arbitration.
The appealability of a district court order granting or deny-
ing a stay pending arbitration, whether or not it was entered
pursuant to the Arbitration Act or in response to a motion to
compel arbitration, is determined by application of the
Enelow-Ettelson rule. There is an abundance of case law at the
courts of appeals level which concerns the scope of the Enelow-
Ettelson rule.49 For purposes of this discussion, those cases
which scrupulously apply the two-pronged test may be ig-
nored. 0 Rather, it is more instructive to examine several cases
which demonstrate the difficulties in the application of the rule
and the ingenuity by which some courts have circumvented its
mandate. These "exceptions" to the rule can be grouped into
four categories.
i. Is the Underlying Claim at Common Law?
The major crisis of conscience facing reviewing courts on the
application of the first prong of the Enelow-Ettelson test has
been raised on appeals from orders denying stays of declaratory
judgment actions in order to permit the determination of an
equitable defense. Of the four courts of appeals which have
addressed this issue, one has flatly declined to hold that a
declaratory judgment is "at common law," 5' one has held, in-
ferentially, that it is,52 and the remaining two have adopted a
48. Despite the broad language of the statute, its compulsory effect is applicable
only to arbitration of contracts evidencing commercial or maritime transactions. Mil-
etic v. Holm & Wonsild, 294 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Kirschner v. West Co.,
185 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Pa. 1960), appeal dismissed, 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962).
Whether the issues allegedly subject to arbitration under a written agreement are
indeed arbitrable is determined by the same criteria used in a § 4 proceeding discussed
in the text at notes 142-44 infra.
49. See note 9 supra.
50. No circuit court of appeals has expressly repudiated the Enelow-Ettelson rule.
There are some cases in some circuits which strictly follow the parameters of the rule
while there are other cases which follow the rule in most respects and deviate from its
policies where the rule is not clear. The latter types of cases will be discussed in the
text. Examples of routine application of the Enelow-Ettelson rule are: United Transp.
Union v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 433 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915
(1971); Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962); United States v. Baker-
Lockwood Mfg. Co., 138 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1943) (decided before Baltimore
Contractors).
51. Wesley-Jessen, Inc. v. Arias, No. 78-1465 (7th Cir. Sept. 7, 1978). See text
accompanying notes 54-59 infra.
52. Hudson Lumber Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 181 F.2d 929 (9th Cir.
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case-by-case approach.53
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the prob-
lem in Wesley-Jessen, Inc. v. Arias.54 Plaintiff corporation 5
entered into an agreement with defendant, Marcelo Chiquar
Arias, a citizen of the Republic of Mexico, to form a company
known as Plastic Contact Lens de Mexico, S.A., as a joint
venture. The agreement provided, inter alia, that the defen-
dant would transmit to plaintiffs all "experience, information,
knowledge, skill and know-how" which the defendant had or
might have acquired regarding the use or manufacture of con-
tact lenses and related supplies and equipment. Further, the
agreement provided that the plaintiff could use any such dis-
closures without charge.
Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaration of the
rights and obligations of the respective parties with regard to
certain alleged disclosures made by defendant which related to
the manufacture and use of contact lenses. In sum, the com-
plaint requested the court to enter judgment declaring that
defendant, despite his demands, had no right to any royalties
in connection with the products produced and manufactured
by the plaintiffs. Defendant filed a motion in the district court
to stay proceedings pursuant to the contract between the par-
ties which allegedly required arbitration of unresolved dis-
1950). See text accompanying notes 59-62 infra.
53. American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.
1968); Wallace v. Norman Indus. Inc., 467 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1972). See text accompa-
nying notes 63-75 infra. 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 38.29, at 214.5-.10 (2d ed. 1978).
54. No. 78-1465 (7th Cir. Sept. 7, 1978).
55. Plaintiff Wesley-Jessen, Inc. was a business corporation engaged in the devel-
opment, manufacture, licensing and sales of contact lenses, and existed pursuant to
the laws of the State of Illinois. Plaintiff Dr. Newton K. Wesley was the chairman of
the board of directors of Wesley-Jessen, Inc.
56. Count I of the two-count complaint charged that the written agreement of
March 24, 1960, provided that the defendant was required to disclose and plaintiff was
permitted to use the information which defendant had acquired regarding contact
lenses. Count II charged that the alleged disclosures of the defendant were not novel
and were never used.
Paragraph 12 of the complaint stated:
There exists an actual and bona fide controversy between the Plaintiffs and
Defendant as to their legal relations in respect to the aforesaid agreement, the
rights and obligations of the respective parties under said agreement, the right
of the Plaintiff Corporation to manufacture, use, license and sell the Plaintiff
Corporation's contact lenses without interference from the Defendant and as to
Defendant's claim for monies and royalties in connection with his alleged disclo-
sures to the Plaintiffs.
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putes.5 7 The court determined that the arbitration clause was
binding upon the parties and stayed the proceeding pending
completion of arbitration. Plaintiff's appeal to the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was dismissed by an unpublished order
for want of subject matter jurisdiction.58 Since the disputes
referred to arbitration included issues in equity, the deficiency
in appellate jurisdiction necessarily must have resided in the
inability of a declaratory judgment action to satisfy the first
prong of Enelow-Ettelson. The Supreme Court denied certior-
ari. 5
On the other hand the Ninth Circuit, in Hudson Lumber
Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., held that an order grant-
ing defendants a stay pending arbitration was appealable in an
action which sought both a declaratory judgment and an in-
junction against arbitration.6 0 The court reasoned that the
plaintiff had "no right"'" to file for an injunction against arbi-
tration when there had been no showing of a breach of the
agreement.12 Thus in eliminating the injunctive relief portion
of the underlying claim, the court necessarily must have as-
sumed that the surviving action for declaration of rights was
"at common law" since it concluded that the order was appeal-
able under Enelow-Ettelson.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co. adopted a case-by-case
approach to the appealability of orders granting or denying a
stay of a declaratory judgment action pending arbitration.63
57. Paragraph 12 of the contract dated March 24, 1960, provided the following
regarding arbitration:
In the event a dispute shall arise between the shareholders or the directors which
is not capable of being resolved under the provisions of this agreement then
before any party hereto shall have the right to submit the matter involved to
litigation in the courts of law, the matter shall be submitted to the American
Arbitration Association and settled in accordance with the rules of the Associa-
tion.
58. No. 78-1465 (7th Cir. Sept. 7, 1978). A petition for rehearing en banc was denied
on October 17, 1978.
59. 440 U.S. 911 (1979).
60. 181 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1950).
61. Id. at 930.
62. Id.
63. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). American Safety Equipment filed a complaint in
the district court seeking a declaration that a licensing agreement entered into between
it and Hickok was void ab initio and that no royalty obligations would accrue under
it. J.P. Maguire & Co., as assignee of Hickok's interests, invoked the arbitration clause
in the licensing contract. Id. at 823. American Safety Equipment filed a second decla-
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The district court, in brief, stayed the two declaratory judg-
ment actions filed by American Safety Equipment pending
arbitration of the licensing contract. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the order was final and appealable reason-
ing that although a declaratory judgment action is statutory,
"[w]here, as here, such an action has required classification
[as legal or equitable], the courts have looked to the basic
nature of the suit in which the issues involved would have
arisen if Congress has not created the Declaratory Judgment
Act."64 Since the dispute between American Safeoty Equipment
and the licensor would have arisen as a dispute at law, were it
not for the Declaratory Judgment Act, the underlying action
was determined to be "at common law."65 Further, since the
dispute between American Safety Equipment and Maguire,
the assignee, was "not [filed] in a vacuum""6 but was an
"adjunct" to the dispute between American Safety Equipment
and the assignor, the court held that the order staying the
second declaratory action was also appealable. To reach this
result the court necessarily must have concluded that the un-
derlying issues were at common law and that the first prong of
the Enelow-Ettelson test was satisfied.66
Four years later the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted
the same method of analysis. In Wallace v. Norman Industries,
Inc., Norman originally sued in the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois requesting a determination that it
was not liable to Wallace for alleged violations of the antitrust
laws, breach of warranty and fraudulent misrepresentation.6
Thereafter, Wallace sued in the District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama for damages and injunctive relief based on
the same underlying franchise contract. The Illinois action was
dismissed on Wallace's motion and Norman filed a motion in
ratory judgment action against Maguire substantially identical in content to the one
filed against Hickok and in addition sought an injunction against arbitration on the
ground that both the license agreement and the assignment were invalid. Id.
64. Id. at 824 (citations omitted). See text at note 73 supra, for a discussion of a
similar balancing approach adopted by'the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
65. 391 F.2d at 824. The approach adopted by the American Safety Equipment
Corp. court is parallel to the one used in ascertainment of the right to trial by jury.
See note 31 supra, and text accompanying notes 16-64 supra and 66-70 infra.
66. 391 F.2d at 824.
67. Id. at 824-25.
68. See text accompanying notes 72-75 infra.
69. 467 F.2d 824, 826 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the Alabama action to stay its prosecution70 pending disposi-
tion of an appeal which Norman intended to file in the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals for the order dismissing its suit. The
district court denied the motion and appeal was taken to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which dismissed the suit for
want of jurisdiction. 7'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the first
prong of Enelow-Ettelson was satisfied since the Alabama ac-
tion for damages was at common law. 72 However, the court held
that the second prong of the test was not met since the stay was
entered to permit the prosecution of a declaratory judgment
action which cannot "be termed as either inherently at law or
in equity. '73 Thus, the court examined the nature of the issues
involved in the Illinois suit, concluded that they were essen-
tially legal and not equitable, and therefore, that there was no
appealable order. 74 The court expressed dissatisfaction with
having jurisdiction pivot on "an outmoded historical distinc-
tion," but determined that it was bound by Supreme Court
precedent."
In sum, the attempt to accommodate Enelow-Ettelson with
the statutory creation of a declaratory judgment has produced
various results depending on how strictly the reviewing court
adheres to the literal requirement of the Supreme Court law.
Literally, since an action for declaratory judgment is statutory,
it cannot be at common law and therefore the first prong of
Enelow-Ettelson can never be satisfied. Some circuit courts of
appeals have been uncomfortable with the mechanism of the
rule and have taken it upon themselves to weigh the essential
nature of the issues underlying the prayer for declaratory relief
in deciding the issue of appealability. This way of proceeding,
however, disturbs the original balance drawn by the United
States Supreme Court from Enelow through Baltimore
Contractors. To the extent that the virtue of the Enelow-
70. The motion was phrased in the alternative requesting the court to stay, to
transfer, or to dismiss the action. Id. at 826.
71. Id. at 827.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. A similar willingness to look beyond formal denominations was adopted in
reference to actions for accounting in Zell v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34 (7th Cir.
1976); Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962).
75. 47 F.2d at 827.
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Ettelson rule lies in ease of applicaton and predictability of
results; the judicial review of orders affecting declaratory relief
has shown that the virtues may be more evident in theory than
in practice. Since the main thesis of this article urges the aban-
donment of the law-equity distinction as the pivot on which to
determine appealability, consistency demands a similar aban-
donment of that distinction in the interpretation of Enelow-
Ettelson's first prong. In addition, since it will be easier for a
court to circumvent the Enelow-Ettelson rule through a redefi-
nition of what is required to satisfy the "at common law" re-
quirement than it is for a court to refuse to follow the rule
entirely, it can be expected that litigants will urge and courts
will be aware of the benefits of adopting the approach of the
Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals. Acquiesence by
the courts to this approach, however, will have the undesirable
effect of increasing the number of appeals available under
Enelow-Ettelson5 without accomplishing the necessary refine-
ment in the criteria used to ascertain the need for an immedi-
ate appeal.
ii. Is There an Equitable Defense or Counterclaim?
In Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp., the Supreme Court
held that a special defense setting up an arbitration agreement
contained in the contract sued upon is an equitable defense
within the meaning of Enelow-Ettelson so that the order deny-
ing a motion for stay of proceedings at law pending arbitration
is appealable." The Court did not state any reasons for this
innovative conclusion" although it most certainly increases the
number of defenses which can be considerd equitable, and thus
increases the number of appealable interlocutory injunctions.
While several circuit courts of appeals have chosen to follow the
76. Because the spirit of Enelow-Ettelson would seem to require a strict application
of the requirements of the test and treating all statutory causes of action as sui generis,
and not as arising under the common law, any tampering with the rule could not
decrease the number of appeals available under Enelow-Ettelson.
77. 293 U.S. 449, 452 (1935). See also text accompanying note 23 supra. The Court's
holding, however, expands the number of defenses which can be called equitable,
increases the number of appealable injunctions, and therefore, goes against the stated
intention to narrowly construe the interlocutory appeals statutes. See Baltimore Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Bo'dinger, 348 U.S. 176, 185 (1955).
78. The Court did not indicate reasons for its conclusion that a defense setting up
an arbitration clause is in equity but it did cite Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
264 U.S. 109 (1924), as a case for comparison.
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holding of Shanferoke5 the court for the Tenth Circuit found
that the narrowing trend of the post-Shanferoke cases warrants
departure from the holding.
In Hart v. Orion Insurance Co., plaintiff Hart, an airline
pilot, instituted an action to recover under a policy insuring
him against occupational disability.8 ° The district court, sua
sponte, stayed the court proceedings until completion of an
arbitration process instituted pursuant to a clause in the pol-
icy. The clause provided that examination by appointed medi-
cal experts would determine whether disability had occurred.81
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the order
granting the stay was not an appealable final order.2 Address-
ing the requirements for appeal under section 1292(a)(1) the
court apparently considered the first prong of Enelow-Ettelson
to be satisfied, but held that the defense of the arbitration
clause was not equitable. The court reasoned first that the
agreement on its face made arbitration a condition precedent
to the payment of the contract amount. 4 Second, the court
recited that a condition precedent defense is traditionally con-
sidered to be in the field of contract law. 85 Thus, the court held
that the defense was "at common law" and not "in equity" for
the purposes of Enelow-Ettelson.8
The Tenth Circuit Court did not address the impact of
Shanferoke on its holding, nor the impact of Ettelson,
Morgantown, and Baltimore Contractors on Shanferoke. Since
there are few objective criteria which can be used to inform the
discretion of the reviewing court in its decision to consider an
arbitration clause in a contract to be a condition precedent or
an equitable defense, one of the strongest policy reasons for
79. See, e.g., Zell v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34, 35 (7th Cir. 1976); American
Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968); Cuneo
Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union No. 34, 235 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir.
1956);Hudson Lumber Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 181 F.2d 929, 930 (9th Cir.
1950).
80. 427 F.2d 528, 529 (10th Cir. 1970).
81. Id.
82. "The granting of a stay of an action pending arbitration must be distinguished
from a final judgment dismissing an action because arbitration must still be pursued
and it differs from an order compelling arbitration. . . solely for that purpose ....
Id. (quoting from Standard Chlorine, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1967)).
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upholding Enelow-Ettelson in its present form as a litmus
paper test is undermined. 7
iii. Extraordinary Writs as Alternatives to the Appeal of In-
terlocutory Orders
A petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition
is an alternative means to secure appellate review of an other-
wise nonappealable order. 8 These powerful and unusual reme-
dies are limited to carefully circumscribed instances where the
court is able to conclude that issuance "is in aid of [the
court's] respective jurisdiction" and is "agreeable to the
usages and principles of law." 9
The jurisdictional prerequisite for invocation of mandamus
or prohibition traditionally has been "to confine an inferior
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to
compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." °
Mandamus is used in those situations in which a court has
acted beyond its jurisdiction, taking action which it simply has
no power to take, or when a court action is erroneous and the
error complained of may be repeated before the case is reviewed
subject to final judgment." Where mandamus commands per-
formance, prohibition orders a court not to act in such a way
as to exceed its jurisdiction.12 Neither writ will correct reversi-
87. Examples of objective criteria are, of course, a provision in the arbitration
agreement which embodies the agreement of the parties on the issue, or case law
forming binding precedent. See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra for a discussion
of the Fifth Circuit's rule that a suit for declaratory relief can be "in equity."
88. Mandamus is common-law writ which issues at the appellate court level pur-
suant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) or FED. R. Ap. P. 21. For the view
that courts should give greater application to writs of mandamus, see Note, The Writ
of Mandamus: A Possible Answer to the Final Judgment Rule, 50 CoLUM. L. REV. 1102,
1112-13 (1950). Two circuit courts of appeals have discussed the role of mandamus as
a method of securings appellate review of orders otherwise not appealable under
Enelow-Ettelson. Standard Chlorine, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 309 n.14 (2d Cir.
1967); Chronicle Publishing Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 294 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.
1961).
89. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976).
90. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
91. See, e.g., Sclagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 111 (1964); Labuy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256-58 (1957); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,
423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
92. Ex parte Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 255 U.S. 273, 275-76 (1921); Alexander v.
Crollott, 199 U.S. 580 (1905).
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ble error nor may it be used to "thwart the congressional policy
against piecemeal appeals. '9 3
There is apparently only one circuit court of appeals case
in which appellant sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
district court to reverse its earlier ruling and deny a stay of trial
court proceedings pending arbitration. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Chronicle Publishing Co. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 14 declined to hold that the district court
judge abused his discretion 5 in granting the stay and thus de-
nied the petition for mandamus. For the purposes of the pres-
ent discussion it is not necessary to reconstruct the Ninth Cir-
cuit's dissection of the case law relating to private antitrust
litigation and the peculiar constellation of facts there pre-
sented. It is sufficient to note that the application of estab-
lished legal principles regarding the high standards which must
be met before mandamus will issue means that mandamus will
seldom offer an escape hatch from the narrow scope of Enelow-
Ettelson.
iv. Other Procedural Alternatives
Finally, there are several other techniques which reviewing
courts have used to manipulate the literal requirements of the
Enelow-Ettelson rule in order to permit or deny appeal of a
given stay order. In Enelow, the Supreme Court in dictum
noted that "the special defense setting up the arbitration
agreement" need not ultimately be a viable defense, (that is,
a defense which successfully defeats a claim) but must not be
a defense which is utterly foreclosed on the facts. 7 In Cuneo
Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, without reference to the Enelow dic-
tum, assumed the distinction between viable and unsuccessful
defenses; amplified upon it, and in so doing clarified it and its
relevance to the Enelow-Ettelson rule. 8 The Cuneo court held
that it had the jurisdiction to review a district court order
93. See, e.g., Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 521 (1956); Bankers Life & Cas.
Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953).
94. 294 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1961).
95. The petitioner conceded that the district court had the jurisdiction to enter the
stay order in question. Id. at 746.
96. Id. at 749.
97. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
98. Cuneo Press, Inc. V. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union, 235 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.
1956).
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which denied defendant union's motion to stay the employer's
action against it until the arbitration provided for under the
bargaining agreement had been completed.9 The employer's
complaint prayed for damages and an injunction from further
violations of the contract.' The court of appeals distinguished
Baltimore Contractors,'10 noted that Shanferoke was control-
ling,'0 2 and held that "the motion for a stay in this case was an
application for an interlocutory injunction based upon the mo-
tion setting up the special defense of a duty to arbitrate."''03
While the explanation of why Enelow-Ettelson supports the
result in Cuneo is less than satisfactory, the court of appeals
did have jurisdiction to review the order.' 4 Further, in the exer-
cise of its jurisdiction the court properly affirmed the district
court order on the ground that the union did not demonstrate
that there were any remaining issues referable to arbitration."5
Thus, Cuneo reinforces a distinction between a determination
of jurisdiction and an exercise of that jurisdiction. While it is
permissible for a reviewing court to evaluate a claim or defense,
conclude that it is frivolous and, therefore, that it has no juris-
diction over it,106 adherence to a strict separation between the
two steps of the analysis as adopted in Cuneo may simplify the
judicial task'01 and certainly limit the number of orders appeal-
able under the Enelow-Ettelson rule. Cuneo refines the second
prong of the rule to require that the stay be sought to permit
the prior determination of an equitable claim or defense and
that the movant for stay bear the burden of proving that the
arbitration clause on its terms applies to the issues raised by
claim or defense.
99. Id. at 110.
100. Id. at 109.
101. Id. at 110.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See text accompanying notes 31-45 supra.
105. 235 F.2d at 111-12. See also Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692 (2d
Cir. 1968).
106. For example, the procedure used by circuit courts of appeals on the review of
Anders motions and briefs blurs the dichotomy between ascertainment of jurisdiction
and assessment of the merits. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See 7TH Cm.
R. 7(a).
107. A similar strict analysis is used by the courts in determining whether a claim
"arises under" the federal constitution, statutes or common law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1976). To invoke federal question jurisdiction the plaintiff must assert a "substantial"
claim based on federal law. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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A second and final example of interpretation by a court of
appeals which alters the requirement of Enelow-Ettelson is
presented by Chronicle Publishing Co. v. National Broadcast-
ing Co.'08 In Chronicle Publishing, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals dismissed an appeal' 9 from a district court order stay-
ing a private antitrust action"0 until final determination by the
Federal Communications Commission of proceedings before it
based on NBC's application to acquire KTVU, a San
Francisco-Oakland television station."' The appellate court
noted Shanferoke wherein the Supreme Court concluded that
a defense based on an arbitration agreement that governed the
initial resolution of the dispute was an equitable defense for the
purposes of Enelow-Ettelson, "I but it concluded that the hold-
ing had been "narrowly construed by the supreme court" to
confine appeal to those orders "in which a defense equitable in
its nature has been made the basis of a stay. . .. ,."I Since the
stay order challenged in Chronicle Publishing was not granted
pursuant to any equitable defense literally, the Ninth Circuit
held that the order was nonappealable."4 In so holding, the
court necessarily concluded that the narrow construction of
Enelow and Shanferoke 5 adopted in Baltimore Contractors
overruled this aspect of the holding in Shanferoke. "I
Similarly, the Chronicle Publishing court held that the sub-
sequent narrow construction of Enelow by the Supreme Court
also negated the dictum in Enelow that the power to stay pro-
ceedings in another court appertains distinctively to equity in
the enforcement of equitable principles, and the grant or re-
fusal of such a stay by a court of equity of proceedings at law
is a grant or refusal of an injunction within the meaning of
section 1292."11 While the analysis undertaken here shows that
Baltimore Contractors does represent a narrowing of the scope
108. 294 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1961).
109. The court also denied issuance of a writ of mandamus. See text accompanying
notes 88-96 supra.
110. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976); Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
111. 294 F.2d at 745.
112. Id. at 746.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
116. 294 F.2d at 746.
117. Id. (quoting Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 382 (1935)).
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of orders falling under the Enelow-Ettelson rule, Ettelson not
Enelow is the high water mark of liberality. It has been,
Ettelson and not Enelow that has been limited in scope in the
case law."' Further, the rejection in Chronicle Publishing of the
above-quoted language in Enelow shows an insensitivity to the
basic rationale for establishing the Enelow-Ettelson rule of
appealability in the first instance. The Enelow Court focused
on the dichotomy between law and equity and concluded that,
with respect to stay orders, the distinction would remain cru-
cial. Just as an order entered by an equity court which stays
prosecution of claims at law is appealable, a district court order
staying prosecution of claims at law pending determination of
an equitable claim or defense pending before it is appealable.' 9
At the minimum, the difficulty the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals experienced in ascertaining the limits of the Enelow-
Ettelson rule and applying it demonstrates that the rule is not
intuitive.2 0 Many years after the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the concomitant fusion of law and eq-
uity it is difficult to appreciate the continued logic of permit-
ting this historical distinction to decide a problem of jurisdic-
tion.
b. Motions to Prevent Arbitration
The second way in which litigants procedurally raise the
issue of the appealability of stay orders entered in pending
cases is by means of a motion to stay arbitration proceedings
in order to permit the prosecution of the court action. The three
circuit courts of appeals which have directly addressed the
issue of whether a district court's refusal to stay arbitration is
an appealable interlocutory order under section 1292(a)(1)
have reached contrary results. The First'2 ' and Second 2 2 Cir-
118. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
119. 293 U.S. at 382.
120. For an illustration of the same point of difficulty in achieving a consistent
application of the rule, compare Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. Troitino, 381 F.2d 267
(D.C. Cir. 1967) with Travel Consultants, Inc. v. Travel Management Corp., 367 F.2d
334 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
121. New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183 (1st Cir.
1972).
122. Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1102 (2d Cir. 1970);
Greenstein v. National Skirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 274 F.2d 430, 431 (2d Cir. 1960);
Armstrong-Norwalk Rubber Corp. v. Local 283, 269 F.2d 618, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1959);
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cuits have held that an order denying a stay of arbitration is
not appealable. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has held
that a motion to stay a proceeding in another forum involves
the "classic form of injunction," and the order denying the
motion is appealable."z
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first circuit
to address the issue of appealability in Wilson Brothers v. Tex-
tile Workers Union of America. The court concluded that the
underlying action of the employer for declaratory judgment
raised essentially equitable issues and thus was not "at com-
mon law" for the purposes of Enelow-Ettelson. 124 Therefore, an
order granting a stay pending arbitration was merely a proce-
dural step in the litigation and was not appealable.'2 The Sec-
ond Circuit subsequently reaffirmed the reasoning of Wilson
Brothers in two cases, one reviewing a district court order
granting a stay pending arbitration 26 and another reviewing an
order denying a stay pending arbitration.2 7 In its latest inter-
pretation of the appealability of a denial of a stay of arbitra-
tion, however, the court held the order nonappealable but also
limited the applicability of Enelow-Ettelson. In this respect the
course of second circuit law interpreting Enelow-Ettelson and
the appealability of stay orders provides a model for principled
exception to the Supreme Court rule.
In Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter the Second Cir-
cuit alismissed for want of jurisdiction an appeal taken from an
order denying a "stay" of the arbitration proceedings which
Wilson Bros. v. Textile Workers Union, 224 F.2d 176, 177 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,. 350
U.S. 834 (1955).
123. A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1968);
see also Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970).
124. 224 F.2d at 177. The court went on the state:
It is perhaps regrettable that the Court did not feel prepared to follow the lead,
rather suggested in City of Morgantown. . . of recognizing the union of law and
equity into the one civil action where the procedural character of these orders
would be realistically viewed in terms of modem trials. As it is, some confusion
must remain; and our decisions permitting appeals from denial of a stay of




126. Armstrong-Norwalk Rubber Corp. v. Local 283, 269 F.2d 618, 620-21 (2d Cir.
1959).
127. Greenstein v. National Skirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 274 F.2d 430, 431 (2d Cir.
1960).
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had been initiated by the defendant-appellee under an applica-
ble employment contract. 2 1 Instead of applying the two-
pronged test of Enelow-Ettelson, which it conceded that it had
followed in the past, the court rejected the applicability of the
underlying historical distinction between law and equity to
orders respecting arbitration and distinguished the triggering
facts of Enelow-Ettelson from the case under review.2 9
Where the order concerns granting or refusing a stay of
arbitration proceedings, however, it is not a grant or denial
of an "injunction" within section 1292(a)(1); the nonappeala-
bility of orders granting or denying a stay of arbitration does
not depend upon the old distinction between law and equity,
and the order is not appealable even where the arbitration
claim, as here, is a legal claim for damages. The reason for
the different approach to stay of arbitration as compared to
stays of other court proceedings is two-fold: (1) appealability
of a denial to stay arbitration would further delay the arbitra-
tion proceedings and thereby eliminate one of the primary
purposes of arbitration, i.e., the speed of the proceedings; (2)
arbitration differs from another court proceeding in the es-
sential respectothat arbitration would not produce an enforce-
able result without further judicial action.'"
This radical departure from the scope of Enelow-Ettelson
was accomplished, then, by judicial construction of the term
which presented the greatest degree of elasticity in meaning,
that is, by interpretation of the meaning of "injunction." The
court concluded that the denial of the motion for a preliminary
injunction against arbitration was not a "stay" of arbitration,
and therefore Enelow-Ettelson did not apply. The court also
held that the district court order did not amount to an injunc-
tion-within the meaning of section 1292(a)(1), and therefore
was not directly appealable under that statute. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, at least in Greater Continental Corp.,
expressed a desire to look beyond labels and to analyze the
injunctive effect of the order. Thus, the concerns of the dissent-
ing justices in Baltimore Contractors and the majority in
Ettelson have found light in the Second Circuit's distinguish-
ing of Enelow-Ettelson from a large group of recurring fact
128. 422 F.2d 1100, 1101-02 (2d Cir. 1970).
129. Id. at 1102.
130. Id. at 1102-03 (citations omitted).
19791
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
situations, namely, appeals taken from orders granting or de-
nying stays pending arbitration when the facts do not support
a conclusion that the stay has had an injunctive effect.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has also concluded that
the same policy reasons which disfavor immediate review of
referrals to arbitration warrant a narrow judicial interpretation
of "injunction" in order to avoid appeal under Enelow-
Ettelson. In New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum
Corp., 1 3, the court declined to adopt a" 'broad literal interpre-
tation of "injunction" ' "132 and held that a district court order
denying a stay of arbitration was not an appealable
"injunction" pursuant to section 1292(a)(1)' 33 nor was it an
appealable interlocutory order under Enelow-Ettelson since
the claim was in equity. 34
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has adhered to the
view that a district court order refusing to stay arbitration is
an application for an injunction and as such falls within the
grant of jurisdiction conferred by section 1292(a)(1). In A. & E.
Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co.,' 35 the court held that the
request for a preliminary injunction against the arbitration was
not a "mere step in the controlling of litigation before the
court," that is, a motion for "stay" of arbitration, but rather
the order denying a preliminary injunction was a "classic form
of injunction""'3 and was appealable without recourse to the
Enelow-Ettelson rule.' 37 The Plastik Pak case is interesting in
two respects. First, the court's analysis seemingly reflects a
willingness to look beyond the formal denomination given to
131. 456 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1972).
132. Id. at 186 (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 186-87.
134. Id. at 186. The policy-judgment nature of the court's decison is emphasized
in the following language:
New England has simply failed to convince us that our refusal to accept an
interlocutory appeal from the district court's order declining to stay arbitration
would on balance have such "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences," espe-
cially in the light of the effect of such "preliminary skirmishing" on the congres-
sional policies embodied in the Arbitration Act.
Id. at 187 (citation omitted).
It is an established rule that arbitration is not an extension of court proceedings
but involves a separate tribunal. Bernhardt v. Polygraph Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198,
202-03 (1956).
135. 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968).
136. Id. at 713.
137. Id.
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the relief requested by the parties to decide whether a motion
to stay or a prayer for a preliminary injunction possesses, in
essence, an injunctive effect.' 8 The court concluded that when
"the [district] court was asked (and declined) affirmatively to
interfere with proceedings in another forum," the order dispos-
ing of the request was an interlocutory injunction appealable
on the terms of section 1292(a)(1).'39 Second, the only logical
way to reconcile Plastik Pak with the Supreme Court law on
section 1292(a)(1), however, is to ground the holding on the
very fortuity of how the party himself characterized the re-
quested relief. An injunction is automatically appealable re-
gardless of the severity of its injunctive effect; a stay may or
may not be appealable depending on the dictates of Enelow-
Ettelson.
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Plastik Pak in
Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., where it held
that a district court order granting a stay of the court's own
proceedings pending arbitration which had not yet commenced
and a denial of a preliminary injunction against that arbitra-
tion was an appealable injunction,' and therefore, there was
no need to apply the criteria of Enelow-Ettelson.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit's rule that an order disposing of
a request for a stay of arbitration is directly appealable under
section 1292(a)(1) is a straightforward and logically correct
rule. Absent recourse to the "injunctive effect" test, the rule is
easy to apply and it properly circumvents the disfavored
Enelow-Ettelson rule. An order disposing of an injunction re-
mains directly appealable under section 1292(a)(1). Unfortun-
ately, the Ninth Circuit rule also permits the parties to force
an appeal from an order even when there is no exigency, threat
of irreparable harm, or other factor typically involved in re-
quests for injunctive relief. For this reason, the Second Cir-
cuit's position embodied in Greater Continental Corp. v.
Schechter may prove to be the better-reasoned approach to the
appealability of injunctions against arbitration even though its
rule is without precedent in the case law.' Greater Continental
138. Id. See text accompanying notes 25-31, 41-45 supra for a discussion of the
Supreme Court flirtation with an injunctive effect test of appealability.
139. 396 F.2d at 713. The court noted that the appeal from a grant or denial of a
stay by a court of its own proceedings was subject to Enelow-Ettelson. Id. at n.2.
140. 426 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1970).
141. See text accompanying notes 128-30 supra and part ImI infra.
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Corp. authorized the reviewing court to look beyond the label
given by the party to the relief requested and to weigh instead
the injunctive effect of the order disposing of the request. How-
ever, complications are raised by the Second Circuit's failure
either to reaffirm a role for Enelow-Ettelson, albeit a limited
one, or to expressly decline to follow the rule. In addition, nei-
ther the Second nor the Ninth Circuit Courts noted that
Enelow-Ettelson does not contemplate a different treatment of
orders disposing of motions to compel arbitration versus mo-
tions to prevent arbitration, nor does it contemplate a differen-
tiation between the broad category of orders which stay legal
proceedings pending disposition of an equitable defense from
the category of orders staying arbitration. Rather, Enelow-
Ettelson turns solely on the substantive distinction between
law and equity in the belief that the lines drawn .therein are
alone sufficient to comport with established precedent and dis-
courage piecemeal appeals. An alternative rule then, must ad-
dress this central concern of the Enelow-Ettelson rule.
2. Independent Actions for Injunctions to Compel or to Pre-
vent Arbitration
a. Mandatory Injunctions
Under section 4 of the United States Arbitration Act a party
aggrieved by the refusal of another to arbitrate pursuant to a
written agreement may file a petition for an order directing
that arbitration proceed."' An order directing arbitration or
dismissing the petition or vacating an award made in a section
4 proceeding following a prior order directing arbitration is
outside the scope of the Enelow-Ettelson rule because courts
have held consistently that such an order is final within the
meaning of section 1291.143 The appealability of a district court
order granting or denying an injunction to compel arbitration
entered in a proceeding not falling under section 4 of the Arbi-
142. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1947).
143. Rogers v. Schering Corp., 262 F.2d 180 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Hexa-
gon Labs., Inc. v. Rogers, 359 U.S. 991 (1959); Farr & Co. v. Cia Intercontinental De
Navegacion De Cuba, S.A., 243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957); John Thompson Beacon
Windows, Ltd. v. Ferro, Inc., 232 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
A proceeding under § 4 had not been considered to be a proceeding for a mandatory
injunction and as a result an order staying the § 4 arbitration proceeding is not appeal-
able under Enelow-Ettelson, and § 1292(a)(1).
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tration Act is determined by a direct application of section
1292(a)(1) without recourse to the Enelow-Ettelson rule:'"
b. Prohibitory Injunctions
If no action is pending a party to an arbitration agreement
may bring an action expressly to enjoin arbitration. While the
Arbitration Act does not specifically provide for such an action,
such an action is not prohibited under general equity jurisdic-
tion.
The appealability of an order granting or denying an injunc-
tion against arbitration is not settled. As discussed, the Second
Circuit in Greater Continental Corp. has concluded that a de-
nial of an injunction against arbitration is not appealable ei-
ther under section 1291 or under section 1292(a) (1) as an order
refusing an injunction.' Without citing any precedent, the
Second Circuit carved out an exception for stays of arbitration
from the general rule of interlocutory appeal of injunctions. 4'
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in
Plastik Pak that a request for an injunction to halt arbitration
was an appealable interlocutory order within the meaning of
section 1292(a)(1). 14 An examination of the policy reasons
which favor a fostering of arbitration will show that the Second
Circuit's approach which weighs the effects of the stay order in
determining appealability is the better method of analysis.
I1. POLICIES GOVERNING THE APPEALABILITY OF STAY ORDERS
A. A Proposed Rule of Decision
The basic rule governing the appealability of district court
orders is that an appeal can only be taken from a final judg-
ment,4 that is, a judgment which disposes of a whole case on
the merits.' The basic rationale of the finality rule is the con-
servation of judicial resources through the prevention of piece-
meal litigation.' A secondary benefit of the rule is that the
appellate court is more likely to correctly assess the arguments
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976); see text accompanying notes 136-41 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 128-30 supra.
146. Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (2d Cir. 1970).
147. See text accompanying notes 136-39 supra.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958).
149. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
150. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1940).
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on appeal if all alleged errors are raised on the basis of one
complete record. Nonetheless, both Congress and the courts
increasingly have recognized that there are some situations in
which the benefits of the final order rule are outweighed by the
harm incurred by the postponement of judicial review. For ex-
ample, reversal of orders entered in actions commenced to stop
arbitration will terminate litigation; reversal of other orders
which stay court proceedings pending arbitration will obviate
the need for retrial. In addition, fairness may demand immedi-
ate review when postponement would deprive the litigant of
ultimate relief.
When the Enelow-Ettelson rule was fashioned, finality was
a fairly inflexible prerequisite to review for the policy reasons
noted above. The major exception to the requirement of final-
ity was embodied in the predecessor to section 1292(a) which
permitted the interlocutory appeal of injunctions.'51 One exten-
sive exception to the finality rule which bears particular rele-
vance to the Enelow-Ettelson rule and the operative effect of
the law-equity distinction has more recently been fashioned. 5 1
Collectively, the exceptions illustrate an increasing willingness
of Congress to delegate more discretion to the courts to deter-
mine jurisdiction and the increasing willingness of the courts
to interpret the jurisdictional statutes within the congressional
guidelines.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 227 (1940). See note 16 supra.
152. One exception which is only tangentially related to the present question is
embodied in the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958 and provides a way to review both
jury trial and arbitration orders regardless of the procedural context in which they are
presented to the court.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1958) provides in its entirety:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such
order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal
to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after
the entry of the order: Provided, however, that application for an appeal hereun-
der shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or
the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
It is important to note that appeals under § 1292(b) are subject to the discretion of
both the trial court and the court of appeals. An examination of the case law has
disclosed no reported cases where a court of appeals has reviewed an Enelow-Ettelson
stay order under § 1292(b). Nonetheless, § 1292(b) would enable a court of appeals to
review a stay order not appealable under §§ 1291 or 1292(a), assuming that a party
had filed the requisite petitions and the district court had entered the needed findings.
[Vol. 63:31
APPEALABILITY OF STAY ORDERS
The first major exception to the finality rule and the first
major departure from strict adherence to the law-equity dis-
tinction is embodied in the law of abstention. This exception
is of particular relevance to an analysis of the Enelow-Ettelson
rule since the development of the case law on abstention also
evidences an abandonment of an historical technical rule based
on the distinction between law and equity. The general rule on
abstention was fashioned in Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman. 113 In sum, the Pullman abstention doctrine author-
izes a federal court to stay or dismiss a federal action pending
resolution of a state court case when the decision of an uncer-
tain or unclear issue of state law' 4 may obviate the need to
,consider a federal constitutional question.'5 5 Such a stay order
is appealable as a final order under section 1291.'58 If injunctive
relief is sought in the district court, the stay is also appealable
as the denial of an injunction under section 1292(a)(1).151 If the
district court dismisses the action the dismissal order is appeal-
able as a final order.' 6 In sum, Enelow-Ettelson has not been
extended to stays of federal proceedings entered on grounds of
abstention.'59
153. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
154. There has been some variation in the degree of uncertainty in the state law
which must be evidenced in order to justify abstention. Brown v. First Nat'l City Bank,
503 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1974); Gray Line Motor Tours, Inc. v. City of New Orleans,
498 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1974); Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 493
F.2d 481, 483 (4th Cir. 1974). In a diversity action the Supreme Court has stated that
abstention is proper when it is "conceivable" that the state court decision might
obviate the need to consider the constitutional issue. Fomaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400
U.S. 41, 43 (1970).
155. Cases decided since Pullman have made it clear that federal courts will also
refuse to determine unsettled issues of state law even when a constitutional issue has
not been presented. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1975); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959);
County of Allegheny v. Frank Masuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959). If no federal constitu-
tional question has been presented, however, the unsettled issue of state law must bear
"on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the
result in the case then at bar." 424 U.S. at 814. See City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest
Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 171-72 (1941).
156. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962).
157. Id.
158. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962); Frank Masuda Co. v. County
of Allegheny, 256 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
159. Appellate review of stay orders which have been entered on abstention
grounds forms an exception to the general rule that there is broad discretion given to
the district court to dispose of stay orders pending before them. Stays of federal actions
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In Pullman, an equitable proceeding in federal court was
stayed pending the completion of the state court proceedings.
Subsequent courts narrowly construed Pullman to restrict ab-
stention to cases in equity. The Supreme Court rejected this
interpretation in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux' ° reasoning that the operation of a stay order is the
same in a legal action as in the equitable. A similar focus upon
the effect of entry of an order rather than on the terminology
used to describe the procedural maneuver would justify an
elimination of the historical technical rule as it applies to stay
orders presently falling under the Enelow-Ettelson rule.',
A second example of the departure from a rigid adherence
to the law-equity distinction is contained in the law on the
right to trial by jury.' 2 In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
the Supreme Court adopted what has come to be known as the
"nature of the issue" test for determining whether a complaint
seeks relief which could have been provided historically at law
entered to await decision in similar federal or state cases are not appealable under §§
1291 or 1292(a) and Enelow-Ettelson does not apply. These stays have been considered
to be "incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket." Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). See also
Morales Serrano v. Playa Assocs., Inc., 390 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1968); Amy v. Philadel-
phia Transp. Co., 266 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1959); Mottolese v. Preston, 172 F.2d 308 (2d
Cir. 1949).
160. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
161. See Glen Oaks Utils., Inc. v. City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1960).
There is another way in which the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux would seem to indicate that the Court is willing to
reject the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine. Thibodaux involved a condemnation suit in which
the district court granted a stay order in furtherance of the policies favoring abstention.
The circuit court reversed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction
without discussing the fact that the stdy order was not an appealable interlocutory
order under Enelow-Ettelson. Nonetheless, Thibodaux can be distinguished from the
average case of the appeal of stay orders since powerful constitutional policies are
involved in the area of abstention.
162. Any litigant has a right to trial by jury in federal court on all claims arising
at law but not on equitable claims. Following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, legal and equitable claims are to be joined in a single action. FED. R. Civ.
P. 1; 13. The objective of the unification was not intended to alter the parameters of
the right to trial by jury. Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Thus,
joinder of legal and equitable claims alone does not amount to a waiver of the right to
a jury trial. McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons, Inc., 177 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1949);
Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1946). The preservation of the right to
trial by jury required that the courts formulate a test for the determination of a "legal"
versus an "equitable" claim. If a complaint seeks relief which could have been afforded
in equity prior to the adoption of the rules then there is no right to trial by jury.
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and thus whether a right to trial by jury exists. 6' Prior to
Beacon Theatres the order of prosecution of claims in the dis-
trict court was governed by a determination of whether the
legal or equitable claim was the most "basic" to the action.'"4
If the legal claims were more "basic" to the action then the
claims at law would be tried to a jury prior to the determination
of the equitable claims. With Beacon Theatres, however, the
Court made it clear that the question was whether there is an
overlap in legal and equitable issues such that the prior trial
and determination of the equitable claims would foreclose de
novo determination of the legal claims for which a jury had
been demanded.'65
While it is not necessary to the scope of the present discus-
sion to describe the case law interpretations of the Beacon
Theatres "nature of the issue" test, it is instructive to under-
line the similarity between the "injunctive effect" dictum of
Ettelson and the concept of practical or legal foreclosure im-
plicit in the Beacon Theatres test. In fact, in determining the
right to trial by jury the Supreme Court has eroded the validity
of the historical test in characterizing actions as legal or equita-
ble. '6 The courts have been aided in their task by focusing on
* the very concept of foreclosure contained in Beacon Theatres. "
It is not overly speculative to suggest that Ettelson was itself
or could have provided a springboard into a parallel undermin-
ing of the historical test in the determination of appealable stay
orders. The effect of such a trend, had it not been emphatically
halted in Baltimore Contractors, 6 would have been to increase
the number of actions that must be characterized as legal and
thus to increase the number of orders that are appealable. Fi-
nally, if the law-equity distinction is no longer central to the
analysis which determines when a right to trial by jury is pre-
served, there is little cogency to adhering to the distinction in
163. E.g., 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACICE 38.14, at 151 (3d ed. 1978).
164. Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922); Van Alen v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 43 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
165. See Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486 (5th
Cir. 1961). For a general discussion of the nature of the issue test, see 5 MOORE'S
FEDEFAL PRACTICE 38.14[4], at 162.6-.9 (2d ed. 1978).
166. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
167. 396 U.S. at 540-43.
168. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955). See text accom-
panying notes 19-29, 38-41 supra.
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determining the appealability of stay orders since the stated
objective of preserving the right to trial by jury will not neces-
sarily be advanced, nor will it be undermined.
In the context of the principled departure from the rule of
finality and the similar abandonment of the law-equity distinc-
tion, continued adherence to the Enelow-Ettelson rule is anom-
alous. First, the Supreme Court's refusal to modify its rule of
jurisdiction following the merger of law and equity may have
been justified at the time of Ettelson, Morgantown and
Baltimore Contractors, but the considerations that prompted
the Court to depart from the law-equity distinction in cases
involving abstention"9 and trial by jury7' also warrant the
abandonment of the distinction here.
The much maligned dichotomy appears to have been pre-
served by the Supreme Court because of deference to perceived
congressional intent."' However, the law-equity distinction
which is fundamental to the Enelow-Ettelson rule is unrelated
to the policy reasons which justify immediate review of an in-
terlocutory order. Irreparable hardship is the main criterion
which courts have used in interpreting section 1292(a) .12 But
rarely is irreparable harm caused by the denial of immediate
review of a stay order. To deny appeal from an order which
stays the trial of issues pending arbitration postpones the dis-
trict court resolution of the issues which, without more, is not
irreparable hardship.7 3 The severity of the delay wliich might
be caused by complete retrial is something which can be
weighed in each case as it arises. Similarly, denial of an appeal
from a court order staying arbitration pending trial postpones
arbitration and the ultimate judicial review of the arbitral set-
tlement. This delay does not necessarily amount to irreparable
169. See text accompanying notes 154-62 supra.
170. See note 31 supra; see also text accompanying notes 162-70 supra. The Su-
preme Court has also ignored the law-equity dichotomy in applying the direct appeal
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976). Bryan v. Austin, 354 U.S. 933 (1957).
171. City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 261 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); see text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
172. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955). See also
Smith v. Vulcan Iron works, 165 U.S. 518, 525 (1897); Chicago Dollar Directory Co.
v. Chicago Directory Co., 65 F. 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1895).
173. See text accompanying notes 46-120 supra. To deny appeal from an order
staying court proceedings where the plaintiff seeks an injunction is more likely to
involve irreparable harm.
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harm. ' To deny appeal from an order entered in a separate
case denying an injunction against arbitration or denying an
injunction to compel the submission of additional issues to
pending arbitration also does not automatically result in ex-
treme hardship. 75
Oh the other hand, immediate appeal of stay orders does
interrupt the proceedings and add to the expense of litigation.
While the virtue of the rigidly defined rule of decision promul-
gated in Enelow-Ettelson is that theoretically it obviates the
need for preliminary judicial determination of the right to ap-
peal, the rule has, in fact, caused lower courts and litigants
alike a great deal of uncertainty as to when a stay order pend-
ing arbitration can be appealed. 176 An alternate approach is to
make stay orders not appealable unless the litigant can demon-
strate irreparable harm because of a delayed appeal. 7  This
more flexible rule is indifferent to the distinction between law
and equity unless the distinction relates to the need for imme-
174. See text accompanying notes 121-41 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 142-47 supra.
176. Among the preliminary problems causing the uncertainty are: deciding
whether a complaint which is an homogenization of legal and equitable and statutory
claims is at law or in equity; deciding whether a defense is equitable; and deciding
whether and when to look beyond the parties' characterization of claims and of relief
demanded in order to ascertain their "essential nature." See text accompanying notes
52-120 supra.
177. But see FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). It is to be expected
that standards applicable to the appeal of stay orders will develop following the model
of standards which exist with respect to securing injunctive relief in federal courts. The
basis for injunctive relief in federal courts has been the likelihood of success on the
merits, irreparable injury, burden on other interests, and the public interest. United
States v. American Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7 (1974); Beacon Theatres v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Jacksonville Port Auth. v. Adams, 556 F.2d 52 (D.C.
Cir. 1977). The balancing of competing claims of irreparable hardship is the traditional
function of an equity court, the exercise of which is reviewable only for abuse of
discretion. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan. Tex. R.R., 363 U.S. 528
(1960); Adney v. Mississippi Lime Co., 241 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1957). While what consti-
tutes an irreparable injury which will justify injunctive relief depends upon the facts
of the particular case, general principles have developed. Courts seem to consider most
carefully the nature of the right which will be injuriously affected. However, the pecu-
niary measure of the loss to be suffered can also be of importance. In first amendment
cases even a temporary deprivation of rights has repeatedly been held to constitute
irreparable harm. Citizens for a Better Environment v. City of Park Ridge, 567 F.2d
689 (7th Cir. 1975). In any case, the irreparable injury cannot be speculative and must
amount to more than mere litigation expense. Frey v. Commodity Exch. Auth., 547
F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1976). In general, irreparable harm amounts to a showing that the
right itself may be defeated unless the injunction is issued. Selchow & Righter Co. v.
Western Printing & Lithographing Co., 112 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1940).
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diate appeal of a given stay order. Irreparable injury will al-
most always be present when a trial court has issued an impro-
per injunction; it will seldom be present when a court has
stayed or refused to stay court action pending arbitration.
While application of this rule may give rise to substantial pre-
liminary consideration by appellate courts, the rule confines
appeal to appropriate cases of demonstrated harm, likelihood
of error, or importance of immediate review and avoids uncer-
tainty as to the right to appeal.
Finally, postponement of appellate review in all cases ex-
cept those in which irreparable harm is demonstrated, or in
which it can be shown that the arbitration agreement does not
cover the resolution of the disputed issues or is otherwise unen-
forceable assures that arbitration agreements are favored under
the law.' By entering into an arbitration agreement the par-
ties have demonstrated their desire to pre-empt or to postpone
judicial determination of the issues. Courts should be wary of
countermanding the directions contained in arbitration agree-
ments in recognition that some claimants are not served by
slow, costly litigation, even if arbitration only postpones re-
course to the courts. In addition, the proposed rule preserves
the general policy behind the Enelow-Ettelson rule to prevent
piecemeal appeals and effectuates that policy by explicitly giv-
ing the courts the responsibility for applying well-recognized
principles of law in order to ascertain those cases where imme-
diate appeal is both efficient and just.
B. Guidelines for Litigants and the Courts
The objective of this article is to examine the present Su-
preme Court rule on the appeal of stay orders, to set out the
circuit courts' application of that rule, and to measure the
doctrine against the policy reasons favoring interlocutory ap-
peal in order to point the way toward an alternate, more rea-
sonable rule. It should not be surprising that the major conclu-
sion of this analysis is that the Supreme Court should take the
first opportunity to decide that the reasons for the Enelow-
Ettelson rule no longer exist and that a new rule should be
fashioned. Until the Supreme Court formally abandons the
rule the task remaining to the courts of appeals and litigants
is difficult.
178. See Comment, Judicial Control of the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction: A Changing
Attitude, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 521 (1964).
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Absent Supreme Court alteration of the rule, the litigant
can so shape his action so that it places him in the most favora-
ble position depending on the results he desires. The mechani-
cal nature of the Enelow-Ettelson rule is absurd not only be-
cause it does not mirror the policy reasons for permitting or
denying appellate review but because litigants can manipulate
it for purposes of delay, or for "sabotage" of an otherwise justi-
fiable appeal. Litigants in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits can urge adherence to the particular modifica-
tions to the Enelow-Ettelson rule fashioned, in those courts.
Principled advocacy will include encouraging the courts to
modify or replace Enelow-Ettelson.
Courts of appeals should practice a jurisprudential civil dis-
obedience. Although adjusting the components of the Enelow-
Ettelson rule may accomplish the desired effects on the basis
of the facts under review, such alterations are often not made
in faithful adherence to the policy reasons which underlie inter-
locutory appeal of stay orders. Abandonment of the rule alto-
gether is made easier by the fact that the Supreme Court has
not addressed the issue since 1954. The continued viability of
Enelow-Ettelson has not been reassessed in light of changes in
the law of the right to trial by jury, abstention, or the efficacy
of encouraging arbitration.
Both litigants and the courts can resort to section 1292(b)
discretionary appeal and extraordinary writs as means to avoid
coming under the Enelow-Ettelson rule when the latter would
prohibit appellate review. However, since an order staying
court proceedings pending arbitration will only rarely be a
"controlling question of law" which warrants immediate re-
view,' 9 and since the high standards of proof applicable to
extraordinary writs will rarely be satisfied, 80 sorting out the
skeins of the law applicable to the appeal of stay orders and
confrontation with the Enelow-Ettelson rule is inevitable.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts must insure that the right to appeal may be
exercised before it is too late for judicial review to be effective.
At the same time, the rules on appealability must be discerning
179. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
180. See text accompanying notes 88-96 supra.
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enough to minimize uncertainty as to the right to appeal and
to promote the efficient disposition of judicial business. Piece-
meal appeals are to be discouraged. The Enelow-Ettelson rule
was fashioned by the Supreme Court in an attempt to preserve
the right to appeal when the right to trial by jury required
immediate judicial determination of the issues or when Con-
gress had already clearly expressed its desire to permit interlo-
cutory appeal. 8'
The circuit courts of appeals have experienced difficulty in
applying the Enelow-Ettelson rule. Enelow-Ettelson is vir-
tually impossible to apply to complaints involving a mixture of
legal and equitable relief.'12 Statutory causes of action also defy
easy classification into those two categories. 8 3 Since, as
Hudson Lumber demonstrates, counsel can circumvent the lit-
eral confines of Enelow-Ettelson by moving for a preliminary
injunction instead of a stay, or by filing a separate suit seeking
an injunction against arbitration, many courts sought to fash-
ion a flexible rule which looks at the "injunctive effect" of the
district court order rather than just the historical origin of and
the technical labels given to the claims and defenses asserted
and the relief requested.'84 The result of the circuit courts' ap-
plication of Enelow-Ettelson is that the appellant is seldom
able to predict whether or not his appeal will withstand a mo-
tion to dismiss.
The difficulty circuit courts of appeals experience in inter-
preting Enelow-Ettelson is understandable given the basic il-
logic of the rule. The right to trial by jury is seldom affected
by stay orders. In addition, the historical distinction between
law and equity, standing alone, has little relation to the need
for immediate appellate review of an interlocutory order.18
The alternative to the Enelow-Ettelson rule discussed in
this article is a rule which permits preliminary appellate con-
sideration of the right to appeal, but makes the right to appeal
under section 1292(a)(1) hinge on the ability of the appellant
to demonstrate irreparable harm if the appeal were to be post-
poned until the termination of the proceedings in arbitration
181. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 52-87 supra.
183. See note 170 supra; see also text accompanying notes 52-76 supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 61 and 121-44 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 165-69 supra.
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or in the trial court.' 6 Criteria should develop, as they have in
reference to the grant or denial of stays pending appeal pur-
suant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8, or to appeals
under section 1292(b), which ultimately would provide more
guidance to both courts and litigants in delineating cases where
immediate appeal is warranted. In addition, this new rule of
decision has the benefit of favoring arbitration and thereby
lightening court dockets when it is possible to do so.
186. See text accompanying notes 166-69 supra.
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